The dialogue between Criminology and the South Sociology of Violence: policing *crisis and alternatives*.

José-Vicente TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS

PHD, Professor of Sociology, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil (1).

1. *Late modernity, crime and violence*

The structural changes of the capitalist mode of production, since the decade of 1980, have produced a crime metamorphosis, the internationalization of criminal organizations and a social fabrication of the violence. Since the end of the Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm, 1994), we might define the first period of the 21st century, beginning in 1991, as the

\[1\] Sociologist, PHD (Docteur d'Etat) by Université de Paris - Nanterre, Professor at Department of Sociology and PHD Program of Sociology of the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre, Brazil); Research Fellow at CNPq- National Council for Scientific and Technological Development; Member of the Executive Committee of ISA - International Sociological Association and of CLACSO - Latin American Council of Social Sciences.
period of the Worldization Process (2), characterized by an expansion of capitalistic activities, global crisis and the culture of post modernity. This new period can be summarized with the title of the age of late modernity (3).

Late modernity, this historical period from the last three decades, is a time of “liquid fear”, because “Fears are many and variable. People of different social, gender and age categories are haunted by their own; there are also fears that we all share – in whatever part of the globe we happen to have been born or have chosen (or been forced) to live” (BAUMAN, 2007, p. 20).

The world panorama is thus marked by world social issues which express themselves in articulated form but with differing specificities in contemporary societies. The present period is characterized by a combination of elements: “the disembeddedness of everyday life, the awareness of pluralism of values, and an individualism which presents the achievement of self-realization as an ideal” (YOUNG, 2007, p. 2).

In this late modernity, diffuse violence spreads, and society and the contemporary states have difficulty coping with it (Giddens, 1996). The social roots of these acts of diffuse violence appear to be based on the processes of social fragmentation: ‘the desegregation of the

2) The terms ‘worldization’ and ‘globalization’ are both used in this article (the distinction is an established one in Spanish, Portuguese and French) to imply two different social processes. ‘Globalization’ means the internationalization of the world economic process. ‘Worldization’ is used to underline the social phenomena created by economic globalization.

organizing principles of solidarity, the crisis of the traditional conception of social rights to provide a framework for thinking about the excluded’ (ROSANVALLON, 1995: 9).

‘Postmodern reality assumes the existence of insuperable conflicts’ (BAUMAN, 1998: 32). That is one of the aspects of the advanced capitalism’s cultural logic: plurality, discontinuity, dispersal. What occur is the phenomena of ‘disaffiliation’ and a breakdown of relations of otherness, diluting the bond between oneself and the other (CASTEL, 1998; BAUMAN, 1998; JAMESON, 1996). Moreover, it is a society “where both inclusion and exclusion occur concurrently – a bulimic society where massive cultural inclusion is accompanied by systematic structural exclusion” (YOUNG, 2007, p. 32). Changes are taking place in social institutions, such as the family, the school, factories, religions and the criminal justice system (police, courts, mental asylums, judiciaries, prisons), transforming the socialization processes, since we are going through a process of crisis and deinstitutionalization. A worldwide landscape of insecurity: “Vertigo is the malaise of late modernity: a sense of insecurity, of insubstantiality, and of uncertainty, a whiff of chaos and a fear of falling” (YOUNG, 2007, p. 12). Consequently, late modern societies produce transformations in crime and in forms of violence. The phenomena of diffuse violence acquire new contours, coming to spread throughout society. The multiplicity of forms of diffuse violence in contemporary societies, such
as violent crime, social exclusion, gender violence, racisms, school violence, is expressed in a microphysics of violence (4).

Nevertheless, crime has changed in the late modernity. According to Jock Young, the definition of what crime is has become problematic for several reasons: 1) nowadays, aggressors are multiple, so the likelihood of becoming a victim has come to seem normal; 2) the causes of crime are also widespread; crime is part of the continuum of social normality, since its relationship with society is constitutive; 3) moreover, the space for action is both public and private, and it occurs in social spaces in dispute – residence, neighborhoods, plazas, private mass properties or streets; 4) also, the relationship between the aggressors and the victims is complex – they may be strangers or intimates, outsiders or members of the in-group; 4) social control over crime is spread over multiple government agencies and informal actions, including a strong presence of private security; 5) the efficacy and efficiency of formal social control are problematic; 6) finally, the public's reaction is oriented by an irrational fear of crime and a moral panic (YOUNG, 1999: 46). In this social world, “the dangerous and oppressive trends in crime and crime control that have occurred in the last three decades are fundamentally rooted in the political economy of neoliberalism, and its cultural and social concomitants” (REINER, 2008, p. 13). It can be explained by the fact that, “neoliberalism is associated

4) This notion is analogous of FOUCAULT’s concept of microphysics of power (Foucault, 1994: 38–9).
with much greater inequality, long-term unemployment, and social exclusion” (REINER, 2008, p. 107)

We are in a civilization malaise, which transformed the contemporary society in an obsessive preoccupation with the individualism and the personal safety. Social inequality became a central concept to explain the social roots of this diffuse violence, so we must answer: what kinds of processes produce the global outcomes of inequality that we are observing and experiencing? (THERBORN, 2006)

Youth people are particularly affected by the exacerbated individualism, the cult narcissism of the individual freedom, with stimulus to a winners” and “losers culture”, which break the sociability bonds. However, the youth relates with violence in an ambivalent manner: sometimes as the victim, sometimes as the aggressor. Its life, in the contemporary society, has been being a fight lawsuit to cohabit, or to overcome, the violence. In fact, “the lethal combination is relative deprivation and individualism” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 48).

2. Neoliberalism and the Administrative criminology

In a political context with remarkable predominance of the USA and UK, neo-liberal economics and neo-conservative politics, the Neoliberal model of coping with crime created what we call “administrative criminology” : this current “wanted to hold out deterrent penalties that would be rigorously enforced and tough enough to act as real disincentives to potentials offenders. Better, more vigorous policing and harsher, more certain punishments were his
preferred solution: more deterrence and control, not more welfare” (GARLAND, 2001, p. 59).

This orientation was compound by several elements. The approach called Right Realism has two dimensions: first, it tends to take an individualized view of crime, looking for explanations in individual choices rather than in broader social or structural conditions; second, right realist responses to the crime problem tend to be coached in terms of greater controls and enhanced punishments” (NEWBURN, 2007, p. 271).

This position in the field of social control takes conventional legal definitions of crime for granted, ignores the importance of socioeconomic context in explaining crime, even reworking in genetic and individualists theories, as well as proposes that crime is caused by lack of self-control. It over-emphasizes control and containment; accepts the fear of crime as rational, prioritizing order via deterrent and retributive means of crime control (NEWBURN, 2007, p. 271). Indeed, “in the view of the right realists the breakdown of moral values and social controls associated with permissiveness was central to understanding rising crime rates” (NEWBURN, 2007, p. 271).

Additionally, the administrative criminology appeals to some concepts of the rational choice theory. This theory can be summarized by saying that “Rational choice theory is based on the idea of ‘expected utility’, assuming that individuals proceed on the basis of maximizing profits and minimizing losses. A rational choice theory allows the difficult question of criminal motivation to be reformulated as a

Another author, the Britain CLARKE explains: “...the rational choice model regards criminal acts as calculated, utility-maximizing conduct, resulting from a straightforward process of individual choice. This model represents the problem of crime as matter of supply and demand, with punishment operating as a price mechanism” (quoted after GARLAND, 2001, p. 130).

Moreover, the administrative criminology emphasizes the control theories (GARLAND, 2001, p.15): “Hirschi states that the common property of control theories at their simplest level is their assumption that ‘delinquency acts result when an individual’s bond to society is weak or broken” (DOWNES & ROCK, 2007, p. 202). In a later version, Hirschi and Gottfredson proposed: “Crime, they argue, stems from low self-control: it provides an immediate, easy and simple gratification of desires that is attractive to those who cannot or will not defer enjoyment. It can be intrinsically pleasurable because it involves the exercise of stealth, agility, deception, or power” (DOWNES & ROCK, 2007, p. 202; REINER, 2008, p. 89).

Finally, there is the component of situational control approach: “The immediate stress of situational control theories, by contrast, is on the purely technical, cost-benefit-ratio aspects of crime: the opportunity for crime available in the environment and the risks attached to criminal activity” (DOWNES & ROCK, 2007, p. 209).

Indeed, this “new administrative criminology with its actuarial stance which reflects the rise of risk management as a solution to the
crime problem” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 27). So on, “an actuarial approach is adopted which is concerned with the calculation of risk rather than either individual guilt or motivation” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 45). In others words: “The actuarial stance is calculative of risk, it is wary and probabilistic, it is not concerned with causes but with probabilities, not with justice but with harm minimization, it does not seek a world free of crime but one where the best practices of damage limitation have been put in place; not a utopia but a series of gated havens in a hostile world” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 66).

This administrative criminology GARLAND said is a ‘new criminology of everyday life”: “The new criminology of everyday life are a set of cognate theoretical frameworks that includes routine activity theory, crime as opportunity, lifestyle analysis, situational crime prevention, and some versions of rational choice theory” (GARLAND, 2001, p.128). And continue: “... the new approach identifies recurring criminal opportunities and seeks to govern them by developing situational controls that will make them less tempting or less vulnerable. Criminogenic situations, ‘hot products’, ‘hot spots’ - these are the new objects of control” (GARLAND, 2001, p.129). Afterwards, “... the new criminology of everyday life approaches social order as a problem of system integration. (...) For these frameworks, social order is a matter of aligning and integrating the diverse social routines and institutions that compose modern society” (GARLAND, 2001, p.183).

The administrative criminology of neoliberalism period build up, during the Reagan Government in USA (1981-1988) and the Thatcher mandate (1979-1990) in UK, a consensus of crime control with five core
elements: crime is public enemy number 1; there is an individual but not a social responsibility for crime; foregrounding victims versus offenders; crime control works; and a high-crime society normalized” (REINER, 2008, p. 124-129). Since them, this “culture of control” has been exported around the world (GARLAND, 2001).

3. The “broken windows” policing model in Latin America

During the 1990’s, the international flux of information concerning policing models from USA to Latin American, , has had many ways of influence, for example: consultancy security firms; projects from the USA Government. Next, we are going to discuss each one of them:

- Consultancy security firms

The beginning was The Manhattan Institute; created in 1978 as a think tank organization: “The Manhattan Institute has been an important force in shaping American political culture and developing ideas that foster economic choice and individual responsibility. We have supported and publicized research on our era's most challenging public policy issues: taxes, health care, energy, the legal system, policing, crime, homeland security, urban life, education, race, culture,
and many others. Our work has won new respect for market-oriented policies and helped make reform a reality” (5).


George Kelling and James Q. Wilson wrote:

“To the extent that this is the case, police administrators will continue to concentrate police personnel in the highest-crime areas (though not necessarily in the areas most vulnerable to criminal invasion), emphasize their training in the law and criminal apprehension (and not their training in managing street life), and join

5 ) http://www.manhattan-institute.org
too quickly in campaigns to decriminalize "harmless" behavior (though public drunkenness, street prostitution, and pornographic displays can destroy a community more quickly than any team of professional burglars). Above all, we must return to our long-abandoned view that the police ought to protect communities as well as individuals. Our crime statistics and victimization surveys measure individual losses, but they do not measure communal losses. Just as physicians now recognize the importance of fostering health rather than simply treating illness, so the police -- and the rest of us -- ought to recognize the importance of maintaining, intact, communities without broken windows" (WILSON, & KELLING, 1982, p. 10).

To work in Latin America, they organized the “Inter-American Policy Exchange”: “to foster increased contact, collaboration, and cooperation among institutions and individuals in the Americas that will result in benefits for both hemispheres. (...) The Inter-American Policy Exchange will build on the Manhattan Institute’s previous work in the countries of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and includes an expansion of our work to Mexico and Venezuela”. A key project of this programme was about Crime and Policing: “On numerous occasions we have brought Institute Senior Fellow George Kelling and former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton to Latin America to discuss the reforms they helped institute in New York City that have resulted in a 65% reduction in serious crimes over the past eight years. (...). In addition to large conferences attended by hundreds—sometimes thousands—of people, these trips always include working meetings with police chiefs and top government officials in each country. These
meetings have now led to formal consulting arrangements with governments in such places as Buenos Aires, Argentina, Caracas, Venezuela and Fortaleza, Brazil to help reform the way policing is done in Latin America" (8).

Nevertheless, the message was diffused not only to the South, but also to Europe. YOUNG reports trenchantly a seminar at Westminster promoted by the Institute for Economic Affairs, in London, July 1997, addressed by Bratton which provoked mixed feelings: “The audience was, to say the least, disappointed: they had come to hear that the simple and the dramatic would work but had heard largely a story of common sense laced with self-congratulation” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 124)

Nowadays, the main noticeable consultancy security firms are The Bratton Group L.L.C., an international police-management consulting firm, created in 1996, and the Giuliani Partners LLC, founded in January 2002.

These organizations are global security firms consulting industry, originated from the case of the New York City Police Department: Major Giuliani chooses William J. Bratton as New York City Police Commissioner (1994-1996). Bratton coordinated a successful managerial reform, which was inspired in the “broken windows” approach of J. Wilson, but also based in the fight against police corruption and the support of a dozen of social projects focused on youth people.

Thus, this model of policing begins to be exported to several countries. In Britain, they have been received in the Home Office

8) http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/iape.htm#04
(YOUNG, 1999). Also, many foreign delegations come to NYPD to be informed about the model (SOARES, 2000, cap. 11, p. 350-376; MARANHÃO COSTA, 2004, p. 145-198).

The same year Bratton moved out his position, he founded The Bratton Group L.L.C., an international police-management consulting firm: “From 1996 on, Chief Bratton worked in the private sector, where he formed his own private consulting company, The Bratton Group, L.L.C., working on four continents, including extensive consulting in South America” (9). Bratton explains:

“Latin America is the new frontier of reform for police work. Having taken part in reforming U.S. police departments, including the New York City Police Department, in the 1980s and 1990s, we see enormous potential for the transformation of policing institutions in South America, Central America and Mexico that badly need the shake-up. The good news is that with major efforts from government, business and citizens, the turnaround is happening now. (...) Yet, as consultants in the region over the past five years, we have seen many positive signs. Political leaders--notably Alfredo Pena, mayor of Caracas, and Tasso Jereissati, Governor of Ceara State in northern Brazil--have made profound changes in their police departments. (...) Much of Latin America’s policing problem is a problem of scale. The region's cities have grown and changed rapidly, but police departments have not grown and changed with them. (...). The military model followed by so many Latin American police agencies further compounds the problem. Accustomed to military-style operations, Latin American police have

9) Source: http://www.lapdonline.org
developed little competence in two essential police functions: preventive patrol and investigation” (10). Since October 2002, Bratton is Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department.

The other global consultancy security firm is Giuliani Partners LLC, founded by Rudolph W. Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, in January 2002. Their mission is: “Giuliani Partners is dedicated to helping leaders solve critical strategic issues, accelerate growth, and enhance the reputation and brand of their organizations in the context of strongly held values”. One of the five principles of the firm is “Preparedness”:

“The public and private sectors face a multitude of risks and challenges stemming from terrorism, crime, natural disasters, market performance, and countless other factors that threaten an organization’s ability to survive. Governments are already taking steps to protect civilians and businesses from the effects of a variety of threats. The private sector can do more to prepare to secure its personnel, assets, and future. Relentless preparation develops a culture of responsibility and awareness”11. The firm has advised business and government agencies on security, leadership and other issues, also in Trinidad and Mexico City, in 2003. As The New York Time reports:

“Rudolph W. Giuliani, the former mayor of New York and possibly the world’s best-paid crime-fighting consultant, ended his first working tour of Mexico City today, after a 36-hour whirlwind of mean

11 ) Source: http://www.giulianipartners.com
streets and chic suites. (...) Mr. Giuliani will seek ways to cut crime in Mexico City, and he promises ideas in four months, results in four years. His visit was the talk of the town, but not so much for his thoughts on civilizing the capital. It was the $4.3 million his firm is pocketing that attracted attention, along with the security cordon that surrounded him: about 400 officers, a force far greater than that usually accorded foreign potentates, presidents or pop stars. (...). His promise to come up with crime-busting concepts is being taken with a grain of salt in Mexico City, by citizens and the police alike" (12).

The main orientation of these consulting security firms is to propose “the policies and practices through which American interests and priorities are exported around the globe”. But, “the fact that several of the most prominent of these firms so aggressively promote the "New York model" is also controversial. The New York model is the approach to crime and disorder taken in New York City under Mayor Giuliani based on a particular interpretation of "broken windows policing." This model justified an especially aggressive law enforcement approach to a number of urban social problems. It is this law enforcement approach that has been exported by leading transnational security consulting firms” (MITCHELL & BECKETT, 2008).

In fact, these firms have advised many of the big cities of Latin America: Mexico City, Caracas, Fortaleza, Ceara, in Brazil; and Santiago, Chile.

12 ) "Mexico City Journal; Enter Consultant Giuliani, His Fee Preceding Him". By TIM WEINER. Published: January 16, 2003. Source: http://query.nytimes.com
In the Brazilian Case, the Governor of the State of Ceara, Tasso Jereissati, made a contract with the “First Security Consulting”, coordinated by Mr. Bratton, in 1997: the project’s purpose was to foster the activities of police integration, with a urban design of “models districts of public security” where all the states agencies should work together (BARREIRA, 2004, p. 10).

The “law and order” discourse, in particular, the New York ‘zero-tolerance’ policy, however, had been imported by conservative political sectors in many Latin American cities, but only in reference to a reinforcement of police presence on the streets, the petty crimes, without any attempt to recreate the entire network of associative services which was a part of the programme in New York.

An evaluation of these policing international policies concluded: “The overarching goal of American assistance to foreign police is clear – to safeguard the United States from criminal activity from abroad’. The theory, however, of the international cooperation seems very clear to BAYLEY: “It is based on the theory that crime is most effectively controlled by punishment. American programs give hardly any attention to alternative strategies...” (BAYLEY, 2006, p. 128-129)

• United States Government international programmes

The relationship between U.S. main political agenda and the building up of policing in Latin American has been established since the XX century (HUGGINS, 1998). However, in the last three decades, it is relevant to note a set which expressed an application, quite in
distinct levels, of the proper U.S. political interests; but less from the political demands of the other country which had received those programmes. On the one hand, it is possible to summarize the policing cooperation (BAYLEY, 2006). On the other hand, there is a bi-lateral cooperation about the “drug’s war”: the Colombia Plan (since 2002) and the Merida Plan (since 2008) (13). Thirdly, the implementation of policing schools abroad, a strategy that we would like to expose in details.

The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was created in 1995, by the FLETC – Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, an interagency law enforcement training organization over 87 U.S. Federal agencies, since 1970, and of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), since 2003 (14). Academies have been established in Budapest, Hungary, 1995; Bangkok, Thailand, 1999; Gaborone, Botswana, 2001; San Salvador, El Salvador, 2005; and a Regional Training Center, Lima, Peru, in 2005.

The FLETC Mission is “We train those who protect our homeland”; “We must provide fast, flexible, and focused training to secure and protect America. They share, for example, the United Kingdom Home Office orientations of “Problem-Oriented Approach to Crime Reduction”: “The PSU trains their police force and analysts to look at the cause of

---


14 ) http://www.fletc.gov
the problem for the purposes of reducing the opportunity for the problem to reoccur” (15). Also they use the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment), a problem-solving model used in these type of strategies.

Another organization, the ILEA - The International Law Enforcement Academy has as its mission: “to support emerging democracies, help protect U.S. interests through international cooperation and to promote social, political and economic stability by combating crime”. ILEA’s objectives are: to support regional and local criminal justice institutional building and law enforcement; to facilitate strengthened partnerships among countries in regions served by the ILEAS aiming to address the problems with drugs and crime; to provide high-quality training and technical assistance in formulating strategies and tactics for foreign law enforcement personal; to improve coordination, foster cooperation, and, as appropriate, to facilitate the harmonization of law enforcement activities within regions, in a manner compatible with the U.S. interests; to foster cooperation by foreign law enforcement authorities with U.S. law enforcement entities engaged in coping with the organized crime and other criminal investigations; to assist foreign law enforcement entities in the professionalization of their forces in a cost-effective manner; and to build linkages between U.S. law enforcement entities and future criminal justice leadership in participating countries, as well as among regional participants with one another.

15) http://www.cms.met.police.uk
For example, the San Salvador Academy “has as its objectives, supporting criminal justice institution building and strengthening partnerships among the regions' law enforcement community. The training focus is on transnational crimes, human rights and the rule of law with emphasis on trafficking in narcotics, trafficking in persons, terrorism, money laundering and other financial crimes” (16).

4. Structural violence in Latin America: how to forget administrative criminology

Latin American societies show an increasing structural violence that demands a new framework of sociology of violence and policing. The globalization process, leading to the creation of social structures determined by the exclusions, mainly produced by neoliberal policies, has provoked new social conflicts and sometimes posed constraints on the consolidation of democracy in this part of the periphery of the capitalist world-system (TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS, 2002, p.123).

Violence as a new global social issue is provoking changes in the state: we are seeing contemporary forms of social control having the characteristics of a repressive social control. The option for a ‘penal social control state’ is growing in late modern societies, accompanied by a systematic appeal to the use of illegal and illegitimate violence (MELOSSI, 1992; PAVARINI AND PEGORARO, 1995; WACQUANT, 1998: 7–26).

16) http://www.fletc.gov/
A general crisis of institutional social control come along the democratic transition processes in Latin America: police brutality; the difficulties of access to justice; the social selectivity of criminal justice; the condition of the prisons; in sum, a loss of legitimacy of formal social control (PINHEIRO et al. 2000).

These elements of the culture of control in Latin America have many dimensions and characteristics. The first is the social production of the paradox of insecurity: “An increasing obsession with security practices and paraphernalia, even if successful in reducing crime, can exacerbate the sense of insecurity by acting as reminders of danger” (REINER, 2008, p. 115). Secondly, the extreme brutality and corruption among the Police in peripheral countries of the capitalist world system (CHEVIGNY, 1995). In addition, the expansion of private security firms, mainly on the ones that have been doing vigilant work in places of ‘mass private property’. A huge problem also remains even nowadays related to the police officers education and the sexual and ethnical discrimination present in their careers. Lest but not least, the respect of human rights by the police work in everyday life. Fourthly, refers to the current mass imprisonment, mainly of young men who belong to the “underclass” or to stigmatized ethnic minorities (WACQUANT, 2000).

Finally, there is the selectivity of the judicial system, the barbarity of the prisons as atrocious warehouses for men and the new forms of electronic vigilance that threaten democracy and individual and collective freedom (TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS, 2000; WACQUANT, 2000). In Argentina and Brazil, there is a discrepancy in the justice
system, from criminal legislation to the prison system, problems in the functioning of institutions responsible for preventing and coping with crime and the increase in crime control: “the loss of legitimacy of the system, its high degree of selectivity and authoritarianism” (AZEVEDO, 2008).

5. The paradox of abstract criminological models and empiric chaos: the Policing crisis in the late modernity

The crisis of policing is configured analytically by a series of theoretical and political insufficiencies, and constitutes one of the new global social issues manifested in several geographic zones in a simultaneous fashion. In U.S. the crisis of legitimacy began in the decade of the 1970s: “This was the case in part because of the tremendous social unrest that characterized the end of the previous decade. Race riots in American cities, and growing opposition, especially among younger Americans, to the Vietnam War, often placed the police in conflict with the young and with minorities” (WEISBURD & BRAGA, 2006, p. 4). In United Kingdom, by the Eighties, “the police were subject to a storm of political conflict and controversy. During the 1984-5 miners’ strike they were in equal measure reviled by the Left and revered by the Right. (…). In the early 1990s, there was a growing consensus between political and police elites about the need to reform policing in a community-oriented direction, aiming to ensure efficiency and quality of service” (REINER, 2000, p. IX).

In Latin American, the political difficulties of policing results from the processes of democratic transition, during the last twenty
years: the efforts to the institutional reconstruction of law enforcement, especially the modes of police practice, after the dictatorship governments (FRUBLING and CANDINA, 2001).

The configuration of the police issue as one of the new global social questions can be witnessed in the record of several international meetings, ranging from the Human Rights Conference (in Vienna, in 1993, promoted by the UN) to the IX World Social Forum (in Belem do Para, Brazil, in January 2009). The debates have analyzed these main themes: the transformations in contemporary society, beginning in 1990 with the changes in the forms of crime, the expansion of diffuse violence and the spread of violence against women, children and old people; the violation of human rights and the victimization of the poor, the young and ethnic minorities; the strengthening of civil society and the involvement of local collectivity with human rights and of the right to security; and all the consequences of these changes on police organizations. These effects involves the question of police management, experiences of community police and charges of police brutality; it includes the transformations in the education of police officers and the new consortia with the Universities (TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS, 2004, p. 89-106).

In sum, these conferences have reached conclusions that indicate the criticism of a model of authoritarian and violent police conduct and the political intention to move towards the transition to other kinds of policing.

The Age of late modernity has shown an increasing crisis of policing (REINER, 2000:216; WRIGHT, 2002; BAYLEY, 1994). An
important evidence of this crisis is: “On the one hand, extensive malpractice has begun to undermine the status and effectiveness of the professional public police. On the other hand, a more community-based police seem as yet unable to meet the needs of a diversity of cultures or to be able to control extremes of deviance” (WRIGHT, 2002, p. 16; see also BAYLEY, 1994:11).

In this context, is quite important to summarize the debate about the four police models in dispute in the contemporary field of social control and policing. Community policing: strategies of decentralized development of performance that enable police to work locally with problems and solutions, rescuing their function of social integration and mediation of interpersonal conflicts on a local level (KÁDÁR, 2001, point 8; COMITÉ EUROPÉEN, 2000: 150, 144; REINER, 2000: 10; YOUNG, 1999; WEISBURD & BRAGA, 2006, Part I, p. 27-73). The system is formulated by Bayley ‘in order for crime to be prevented’ and has the core function of policing in a ‘neighborhood police officer’, who would be ‘community based in a double sense’: ‘They would be based in communities, rather than entering them episodically in response to calls for service. And the problems they handle would be those based on community conditions’ (BAYLEY, 1994: 147; see also DIAS NETO, 2000)

- Management theory: the ideas of ‘total quality’, borrowed from the business principles of management to the ‘new public management’ (WRIGHT, 2002: 160–166). Here, the orientation of the police work changes, because “the adoption of the language of consumerism in late modern policing is already clear, through the discourse of “services”….Police carry out surveys mainly to establish
customer satisfaction" (WRIGHT, 2002: 174). Frequently, this approach was completed with “third-party policing” (WEISBURD & BRAGA, 2006, Part V, p. 191-221).

• Tough Police, confirming a ‘law and order’ point of view about policing in the late modernity societies: ‘The nubs of my conclusion are that all the reform initiatives of recent years have been vitiated by a failure to reject the ‘law and order’ framework, and to recognize the inherent limitations of the policing. They have been fatally damaged by government policies which aggravated unemployment and exclusion, especially among the young and ethnic minorities, creating problems of policing in a new and growing underclass’ (REINER, 2000: 10). It means the demand for a tough police, oriented by the “zero tolerance” notion in North America, Latin America and Europe (REINER, 2000: 11-12; COMITÊ EUROPÉEN, 2000: 144; KÁDÁR, 2001: 9–10; BAYLEY, 1994: 143; YOUNG, 1999, p. 123-124; WEISBURD & BRAGA, 2006, Part II, p. 77-114).

   Indeed, in New York, the crime mapping and the statistical analyses used by the police – the COMPSTAT – became a global innovation in police management (WEISBURD & BRAGA, 2006, Part VII, p. 267-301).

• The Citizenship police: the late-modern policing is directed by peacekeeping, conflict management, criminal investigation, risk management, and the promotion of community justice (WRIGHT, 2002, p. XIII; p. 177). Police organizations could use new approaches to straighten their relationship, communication and reciprocity with civil society (WRIGHT, 2002: 175). This model will necessary respect for the lawful democratic state, approving ‘professional rules’ for the police
who would keep the balance between ‘freedom and security’ (KÁDÁR, 2001, point 3, 7; COMITÉ EUROPÉEN, 2000: 13, 144, 150; see also BAUMAN, 2006)

We could then think about the construction of a world citizenship, oriented to the prevention and eradication of the forms of diffuse violence and the construction of another ideal-type of police, the Citizenship Police.

The feature of the reform being discussed includes accountability to the community, proximity, social conflict mediation, and is shaping the field of a democratic social control (ROLIM, 2006). This is a social field in which different agents of social control participate (police officers, judges, lawyers, prison managers, social scientists, journalists). They share their theoretical, technical, and political stands in order to develop the practices, the forms of police organizations and the right to security, into the new century (TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS, 2004, p. 89-106).

6. Sociology of Violence and the alternatives of policing

“The crisis in criminology is a crisis of modernity” (YOUNG, 1999, p. 32), derived from five majors challenges: “the rise in the crime rate; the revelation of hitherto invisible victims; the problematization of crime; the growing awareness of the universality of crime and the selectivity of justice; and the problematization of punishment and culpability” (YOUNG, 1999, p.34).
For the explanation of social problems of our times it’s possible to observe changes in contemporary sociological thought, particularly the flourishing of a sociology of violence, both in France (WIEVIORKA, 2004), United States (COLLINS, 2008) and strongly in Latin America (ADORNO, 1999; ZALUAR, 2004; MISSE, 2006; GROSSI-PORTO, 2006; BARREIRA, 2008; TAVARES-DOS-SANTOS, 2009). These sociological tradition combines empirical research, theoretical explanations and social commitment.

These heritance is an intellectual work about modes of domination, social control, social conflicts, and invention of new social institutions. Consequently, we would like to produce a contribution for the enlargement of the sociology of violence, but also to foster the critical approach that could help to go beyond the fears of late modernity.

The emergence of collective action and institutional initiatives is the expression of a movement against violence. That movement has been, on the one hand, a multiplication of plans to prevent violence and reduce violent crime, viewed as new alternatives for public security policies capable of guaranteeing citizens’ right to security. On the other hand, it is the expression of an effort of collaboration between Public Universities and the State, which has been advantageous, indicating a movement towards the transformation of curricula, content and conceptualization of the police officer’s role.

Thus, in Latin America, some processes are evidenced: a) the police’s crisis of effectiveness and legitimacy without a reform initiative
In other words, the emergence of the concept of citizen security in the perspective of worldization assumes the social construction of a democratic, non-violent and transcultural police organization, which returns to the objective of policing as a part of governmentality. There is a visibility and a conceptualization of the importance of social struggles against the worldization of injustice, not just as a form of resistance but also with a positive dimension: small-scale and plural struggles, a negation of the forms of exercise of domination. We find new agents of resistance; the social movements confront the centrality of state power over social space-time, but their social mobilizations are affirming the cartography of small experiences to a rearrangement of the social world: “another world is possible” for a “good living”, says the IX World Social Forum final statement, in the Belem do Para, Brazil, February 2009.

So, Latin American Societies should assert the objective of policing concerned with practices of emancipation and also communicating with the practices of the social groups, of all genders, ethnical origins and ages in their everyday life. The noteworthy theme is to include the collective security of citizens in a complex of civil, political and social rights.

The emergence of a notion of citizenship police, under the perspective of worldization, entail the social construction of a policing oriented around human dignity and equity, on a worldwide perspective. This will be a mode of participation in a collective fabric of sociological imagination about violence and policing for the future.

References


BAUMAN, Zygmunt. Liquid Fear. Cambridge, Polity, 2006


QUINTANA TABORDA, Policía y Democracia en Bolivia. La Paz, PIEB, 2005.


TAGLE, Fernando T. El sistema de justicia penal en la Ciudad de México. Mexico, FCE, 2002.


